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Abstract: The trade of illegal narcotics through Mexico has resulted in the rise of 
powerful and organized criminal businesses that are not afraid to bribe, or kill, any who 
cross them. This has caused a dramatic increase in violent crime and government official 
corruption. This document will begin by defining these organizations and examining their 
creation. Next the violence caused by these organizations will be analytically categorized 
in order to better understand the criminal's motivations and tactics. This study will 
examine current data to determine which populations are more prone to violent crime or 
corruption by looking at the victims relationship to the drug trafficking market. The three 
possible categories are cartel members, government workers or citizens, and all three will 
be subcategorized. Lastly, this document will examine how the type or nature of the 
violence utilized by drug traffickers changes in order to accomplish specific goals.  
 
Keywords and phrases: Mexico, drug trafficking, violence, drug war, corruption, 
narcotics, kingpin, torture, organized crime, execution 
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Introduction 
  
In 2006, Mexico declared war against the drug trafficking organizations operating within 
its borders. While narcotic trafficking has always attracted crime and crime groups, few 
expected the magnitude of the response from the Mexican transnational criminal 
organizations. The violence in Mexico has grown to unparalleled levels, occurring in 
more locations, with more frequency, and reaching previously unimagined levels of 
cruelty. Incidents of beheadings, mutilations, and piles of bodies left for public display 
are all too common. Additionally, corruption in the Mexican Criminal Justice System 
caused by these drug trafficking organizations has grown dramatically. This is 
exemplified by the firing of 3,200 federal police officers, almost 10% of the force, in 
August of 2010 for failing basic integrity tests (Beittel, 2012) 
The rampant escalation of corruption and violence in Mexico is beginning to 
affect the state of democracy (Beittel, 2012). Citizens are starting to question whether the 
government has the ability to protect them (Guerrero-Gutierrez, 2011) and if left 
unchecked, these criminal acts could cause more severe problems. The extensive use of 
violence and corruption by Mexican criminal organizations must be better understood in 
order to promote a peaceful and law-abiding society. To that end, this paper attempts to 
bring new light to the problem by focusing on the victims of violence and corruption in 
order to determine if specific populations are more vulnerable to certain criminal acts 
than others. An individual’s role and its impact on drug trafficking directly affects the use 
of violence and corruption by Mexican crime organizations, the type, nature, degree and 
purpose behind the act, and the goal sought after. 
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Prior this analysis, several points must be considered: the accuracy of current 
information, the definition and evolution of these criminal organizations, and why these 
organizations use violence and corruption. General trends of the violence and corruption 
in Mexico will also be considered. An analysis of the potential victims of violence and 
corruption based on an individual’s three possible roles will be examined and then a look 
at the potential application of this information. 
 
Considerations 
 
Before an analysis of how a person’s occupation impacts their type, nature, and degree of 
violent victimization, several items must be addressed.  
 
Accuracy 
 
The accuracy of current information is problematic for several reasons. Broadly speaking, 
crime, especially corruption, is secretive by nature; determining the quantity, goal, or 
purpose of a crime, or whether a crime occurred at all, can be difficult. Ascertaining if an 
act was motivated by drug trafficking can be difficult as well. While it is easier to 
determine if a violent crime occurred due to the evidence left behind, new evidence is 
being discovered constantly and current statistics may not accurately reflect this.  
There is reason to distrust the accuracy of information regarding the situation in 
Mexico specifically. All levels of the Mexican government have been found to have 
corrupt elements (Beittel, 2012) and are notorious for poorly documenting and 
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investigating crimes; this impacts the accuracy and reliability of their information. Some 
municipalities have little, if any, documentation and some even lack the presence of the 
Mexican government (Schatz, 2011). Additionally, journalists in Mexico are often a target 
of violence by drug trafficking organizations in order to prevent anti-drug trafficking 
media coverage.  
To counter this, scholars have turned to three sources for information: the 
Mexican media, independent institutions, and private researchers. Since journalists and 
news stations are constantly targeted for violence, some media outlets are more reliable 
for drug-affiliated news. Due to their clear documentation and systematic labeling 
process, information provided by the national newspaper La Reforma are considered 
reliable, although limited; their journalists do not have access to all the resources the 
government has. The Trans-Border Institute, which operates out of San Diego, documents 
trends, frequency and locations of drug trafficking-related activity in their annual reports 
(Molzahn, Ríos & Shirk, 2012). A librarian in New Mexico, Molly Malloy, is also being 
credited with an accurate drug trafficking organization-related violence tally (O’Reilly, 
2012). While these three examples may differ in their exact number and definition of 
DTO-related crimes, when used in conjunction with each other they show trends useful in 
analyzing the situation in Mexico. 
 
Definition 
 
These criminal groups must first be defined. There are many different labels for these 
Mexican criminal organizations, each with their own strengths and weaknesses. The 
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common term "cartel" is a misnomer, as it actually refers to businesses or corporations 
that fix prices. "Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO)" or "Mexican Drug Trafficking 
Organization (MDTO)" accurately describes a dominating aspect of these organizations, 
but doesn't take into account the newly-found criminal diversity of these groups. The 
term "Transnational Criminal Organization" is used by the United States government, and 
while it does capture the criminal diversity element, only two of the criminal 
organizations are actually transnational in their operations (Seelke and Finklea, 2011). 
"Organized Crime Group (OCG)" encompasses all aspects of these organizations, but is 
considered by most to be too broad (Molzahn, Ríos & Shirk, 2012). The terms 
“Organized Crime Group” and “Poly-Criminal Organizations” also fail to capture the 
excessively violent nature of these groups (Seelke and Finklea, 2011). Despite their 
varying strengths and weaknesses, this paper will often use many of the previous terms 
interchangeably.  
While many terms may be used interchangeably, there are two that do not 
accurately describe these organizations. Some have tried to label these groups "terrorist 
cells" or "insurgents" due to their violent tactics and disregard for human life (Beittel, 
2012) and in 2011, a Republican Texas Senator moved to have six of these organizations 
labeled as "Foreign Terrorist Organizations” on these grounds (Alexander, 2012). 
However, these organizations seek only to engage in criminal activity, not capture or 
replace the existing government (Kan, 2011), which are crucial components in defining a 
group as terrorist or rebellious. Thus the problem is considered one of criminality, not 
terrorism (Beittel, 2012).  
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Finding a term that encompasses all aspects of these criminal organizations can be 
difficult, but their goals are quite clear. These criminal organizations exist solely to make 
money (Kan, 2011). Their wealth-focused agenda is comparable to that of a business, and 
the United States has begun to conceptualize these groups as profit driven corporations 
(Beittel, 2012). They’re also characterized as a special interests group, albeit an illegal 
one (Thoumi, 2003). These organizations specialize in the production, transportation and 
distribution of illegal narcotics. This is not their only source of income, but has 
traditionally been their main source. Drug trafficking was the activity that gave birth to 
the violent struggle we find in Mexico today. 
 
Background 
 
History of Drug Trafficking and the Evolution of Mexican Cartels 
 
Mexican organized crime specializes in trafficking many different drugs that are illegal in 
the United States, but the three most popular are cocaine, marijuana and heroin. All three 
grow in the climates of South America. Cocaine, currently the most financially-
significant drug for Mexican traffickers, is produced from the coca plant which grows 
well in the mountains of Peru, Bolivia and Columbia (Thoumi, 2003).  
 Modern Mexican organized crime groups got their start from South American 
traffickers. The infamous Medellin and Cali drug trafficking organizations operated out 
of Columbia, and came to dominate the South American illegal trafficking industry in the 
last quarter of the 20th century. They shipped huge amounts of narcotics through Florida 
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by boat in the 1980’s; approximately 80% of cocaine consumed in the United States 
during this time was shipped through the port in Dade County, Florida (Gootenberg, 
2010). 
Eventually the United States recognized the need for greater constraints on this 
trade. They began patrolling the Caribbean routes more extensively while, with the help 
of the Columbian government, attempting to dismantle the Columbian cartels (Beittel, 
2012). This had at least three direct effects on the drug trade: first, Columbian cartels 
switched their primary cash crop from marijuana to cocaine, as it was both more valuable 
and easier to smuggle (Rengert, 1996). Secondly, Columbian OCG’s had less manpower 
to transport the drugs and, lastly, cartels had less money to pay for transport. What they 
did have was a highly marketable product and they struck a deal with Mexican criminal 
elements; the Columbians would pay them $1,000- $2,000 per kilogram of coke 
smuggled into the United States (Simser, 2011). However, as Columbian traffickers 
began to feel more governmental pressure, Mexican criminals were able to get better 
deals: they received higher trafficking wages, then were eventually paid in cocaine 
(Gootenberg, 2010). The amount of Columbian cocaine ferried via Mexican criminal 
organizations into the United States grew from 30% in the mid-late 1980’s to at least 50% 
in the early 1990’s (Molzahn, Ríos & Shirk, 2012). Some experts hypothesize that 
travelling through Mexico was the preferred and primary method of trafficking 
Columbian cocaine as early as 1992 (Gootenberg, 2010). 
A national Mexican cartel, often called La Federacion or the Guadalajara cartel 
(Astorga & Shirk, 2010), was formed to ship the cocaine. The formation of Mexican 
criminals into an organized illegal corporation was caused by several factors. First, the 
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original members and leaders of the Federation were related to each other by family ties 
or marriage. This promoted internal cohesion and cooperation, which is often something 
found wanting in organized crime groups (Simser, 2011). Secondly, Columbian cartels 
paid the Guadalajara cartel in product; this required them to sell cocaine, instead of just 
traffic it, in order to realize a profit (Simser, 2011) and the greater demand for illegal 
drugs in the United States encouraged La Federacion to sell it across the border (Seelke 
and Finklea, 2011). Third, the ruling Mexican political party, the PRI (Institutional 
Revolutionary Party) was notoriously corrupt. They had complied with traffickers since 
the Mexican Revolution (Gootenberg, 2010). Their corruption is epitomized in the state 
sponsored protection racket that formed (Snyder & Duran-Martinez, 2009), which 
regulated and protected drug traffickers (Berrong, 2009) while minimizing competition 
(Gootenberg, 2010). The Federation and the PRI reached a bargain; traffickers would 
show deference to public officials, refrain from kidnapping, help discredit PRI rivals 
(Morris, 2012), and avoid violence against top officials (Simser, 2011). In return, they 
were allowed to traffic drugs, corrupt PRI-supporting officials, and generally manage 
their own affairs (Simser, 2011). Finally, weak law enforcement measures encouraged 
both local corruption and collusion with drug trafficking organizations (Simser, 2011). 
However, La Federacion was not to last. The Guadalajara cartel's breakup was 
caused by two reasons. First, personal conflicts among the original traffickers in the DTO 
lead to defections, betrayals and eventually violence. Without the previous level of trust 
between members, competing elements within the organization began to form separate 
rival organizations (Astorga & Shirk, 2010). Secondly, the 71-year-old authoritarian rule 
of the Institutional Revolutionary Party ended in 2000 with the presidential election of 
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Vicente Fox (Berrong, 2009). With the PRI no longer in power, the state sponsored 
protection racket was broken, and the new drug trafficking organizations no longer had 
security or trust in their arrangements with government officials (Snyder & Duran-
Martinez, 2009). Competition between trafficking organizations began to increase, which 
caused a corresponding escalation in violence.  
The point was reached that the government needed to intercede, and in 2006 
President Felipe Calderon declared a war on the cartels. The Mexican strategy, partially 
funded by the United States through the Merida Initiative, gave the military the authority 
to directly oppose drug traffickers and organized crime (Seelke and Finklea, 2011). The 
Mexican military now actively participates in the maintenance of law and order, and is 
responsible for peace and social stability (Moloeznik, 2003). However, military 
intervention was designed to be a temporary measure until police forces, through 
additional equipment and training, could once again deal with drug trafficking 
organizations (Beittel, 2012).  
In order to reduce the scope of the drug trafficking problem, several strategies 
were implemented. The Mexican government adopted a nonselective policy that focused 
on dismantling the criminal organizations in order to reduce the problem from a national 
security threat to a law and order problem (Beittel, 2012). However, many have 
questioned the wisdom of a non-differential dismantling strategy in eliminating organized 
crime and impeding the flow of illegal narcotics (Rengert, 1996; Beittel, 2012; Molzahn, 
Ríos & Shirk, 2012). Additionally the Mexican government began to focus on removing 
cartel leaders. Called the "Kingpin" theory, removing leaders would create greater 
tensions and instability in criminal organizations, which would fragment into smaller and 
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more easily manageable groups (Guerrero-Gutierrez, 2011). The effectiveness of this 
strategy is in question as well; the Kingpin strategy has been shown to increase violence 
in areas where it is applied (Guerrero-Gutierrez, 2011) while having a negligible effect on 
disrupting drug trafficking (Beittel, 2012). 
 
Current Drug Trafficking Statistics 
 
 The trafficking of cocaine, heroin, and marijuana has attracted entrepreneurs for decades, 
due in no small part to the enormous profits that can be made (Rengert, 1996). The DEA 
estimated that in 2010, drug traffickers worldwide made at least $350 billion in profits 
(Vulliamy, 2010).  Sources also estimate that in 2010 the worldwide markets for heroin 
and cocaine were, respectively, $65 and $88 billion (Simser, 2011). In areas where drug 
income is the primary route to gaining wealth, which describes many urban and rural 
areas of Mexico, the acceptance and popularity of drug trafficking increases (Rengert, 
1996).  
 Many traffickers attempt to ship drugs to the United States because of the high 
demand. Thirteen million United States citizens a month spend approximately $200 
billion annually on illegal 
drugs (Warner, 2012). 
Trafficking cocaine is of 
special interest to Mexican 
smugglers, as it makes up          (Figure 1) 
Illegal Drug Trafficked Estimated Percent of Cartel Profits 
Cocaine 60.0 - 62.0 
Marijuana 20.0 - 25.0 
Heroin 8.0 - 11.0 
Amphetamine 1.0 - 2.0 
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approximately 60% of a DTO’s income (see figure 1 for more detail). Ninety percent of 
cocaine consumed in the United States, valued at an estimated $37 billion, travels 
through Mexico (Guerrero-Gutierrez, 2011). The potential for extreme revenue appeals to 
many people from Mexico. Serving as a lookout, reportedly the lowest paying job on the 
DTO pay scale, can earn you at least $800 a month, which puts many in the top 10% of 
their community. Gunmen and traffickers make even more (Stout, 2012).   
 How much money flows to Mexican criminal organizations is a question often 
debated. ICE estimates that MDTO’s make between $19 and $29 billion dollars in profit; 
the DEA estimates between $8.3 and $24.9 billion (Guerrero-Gutierrez, 2011). To put this 
in perspective, Google’s worldwide revenue in 2009 was only $23.6 billion (Kellner & 
Pipitone, 2010).  
 
Why Cartels Use Violence and Corruption 
 
Using a business model, we can see why drug trafficking criminal organizations may 
choose to use violence. In order for any company to make money, the product must get to 
the client. In an illegal, and increasingly competitive, market, this can be difficult as there 
are many potential problems. The illegality of the product makes it vulnerable to theft by 
other criminals and seizure by the state, renders written records and property rights 
useless, and requires greater secrecy and mobility in the salesman. The possibility of 
punishment by the state, including jail or prison time, physical injury, or death, increases 
the magnitude of the risk taken and the need for both parties to make a successful 
transaction (Kan, 2011). Additionally, the more profitable the potential dealings are, the 
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greater the need for stability and a successful transaction (Rengert, 1996). Illegal markets, 
by their nature, lack the stability and predictability found in legal markets; violence may 
be used, by either the buyer or seller, to create this stability, while corruption may be used 
to minimize or neutralize the threat from the state (Kan, 2011).  
There exists another condition that may cause drug trafficking organizations to 
opt for violent action. There is nothing that can impose order. Those that traffic narcotics 
don’t recognize the legal authority of the Mexican government and thus refuse to obey its 
laws. The Mexican government is purging itself of corrupt elements, removing the 
potential of forming another state sponsored protection racket. No single criminal 
organization is strong enough to impose order on all other cartels, and the 
hypercompetitive market and potential for great profit prevents a coalition of cartels from 
banding together to impose order (Kan, 2011).  
The lack of an arbitrator able to enforce order creates a new option for expanding 
an organization’s profit. Instead of improving the quality of their product, reducing prices 
or brokering deals, these organizations can obtain a greater profit by simply removing 
their competitors (Kan, 2011). This tactic would be extremely difficult to perform in a 
competitive illegal market with an order-imposing arbitrator and nigh impossible in a 
legal one.  
The need for stability in illegal markets and the violent removal of problems is 
exemplified in the "Plata o Plomo" attitude adopted by Mexican cartels (Simser, 2011). 
Directly translated as "silver or lead", it's also called the "bribe or bullet" mentality 
(Thoumi, 2003). When the cartels approach a citizen with a job, that person is given a 
choice: work with the drug traffickers, or risk the bodily harm or death of himself and 
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potentially his family. There is no middle ground and often no chance to negotiate. The 
Mexican TCO’s use force and threats of force to create predictability, and remove and 
replace those individuals that refuse to “play ball.” 
 
MDTO Violent Crime Statistics and Trends 
 
 The quantity of drug trafficking-related violent crime in Mexico has steadily increased 
since President Calderon’s declaration of war in 2006. The current figures are often 
debated due to the varying ranges; most media sources have settled on about 50,000-
70,000 deaths from December 2006 through June 2012, although one researcher, Molly 
Malloy, estimates that the total could be close to 100,000 (O’Reilly, 2012). As a note of 
comparison, the “Troubles” committed by the IRA in Northern Ireland killed only 3,500 
people and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Turkey killed a little over 12,000 (Kan, 2011).  
 Another disturbing trend is the increase in the number of fatalities in each violent 
drug trafficking-related encounter. It’s been noted that before 2010, no violent skirmish 
between drug traffickers and rivals, the government, or the public resulted in the death of 
more than twenty five victims at one time (Moore, 2012). However in August of 2010, 
Los Zetas bound, blindfolded and executed 72 illegal immigrants (Moore, 2012). Some 
sources hypothesize that their death was the result of their refusal to help the Zetas traffic 
drugs across the border (Seelke and Finklea, 2011).   
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 The rate of drug trafficking-related homicides has also increased since President 
Calderon declared war on the cartels. Approximately 2,200 people died due to drug 
trafficking violence in 2007, and the number of drug related killings only increased in the 
following years (Seelke and Finklea, 2011; see figure 2 for more details). The 2010 
Mexican National Police estimated 
the homicide rate for Mexico in 
2010 was 18.1 people out of every 
100,000 (Me, Bisogno & Malby, 
2011). The World Health 
Organization states that a homicide 
rate exceeding 10 per 100,000 people    (Figure 2) 
is considered one of epidemic proportions (Doggett, 2011).  
 
Location of DTO Violence 
 
The location of drug trafficking-related violence in Mexico has changed. Traditionally 
this violent crime has been highly concentrated in either Mexican states bordering the 
U.S., such as Chihuahua, Baja California, and Tamaulipas, or coastal states like Sinaloa 
(see figure 3). Government data states that in 2010, northern border states accounted for 
roughly 50% of all homicides. Additionally the violence has been highly concentrated. 
80% of drug trafficking-related violence occurs in 7% of Mexican municipalities. The top 
1% of municipalities with the highest rates of violence is located in only 5 states, with 
Chihuahua having two high violence zones (Beittel, 2012).  
Year DTO-Related Fatalities 
2007 2,200 
2008 5,100 
2009 6,500 
2010 11,500 
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 (Figure 3, Courtesy of the Trans-Border Institute and the Justice in Mexico Project) 
 
However, the violence is starting to move inland (see figure 4). The same border 
states previously mentioned accounted for only 44% of all Mexican homicides in 2011. 
Previously unaffected areas, such as Monterrey and Guadalajara, are also increasing in 
drug-related violent crime (Beittel, 2012). Some researchers are starting to believe that 
the change in drug-related violence location is partially caused by the fragmentation of 
drug trafficking organizations (Beittel, 2012; Guerrero-Gutierrez, 2011). Violence has 
been, for the most part, limited to Mexico, although experts are concerned at the 
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possibility of drug-related crime "spilling" into the United States (Finklea, Krouse & 
Rosenblum, 2011). 
 
 
(Figure 4, Courtesy of the Trans-Border Institute the Justice in Mexico Project) 
 
Categories 
 
Even though the location may differ, there are patterns concerning who is targeted for 
violence and what kinds of violence are used against them. Victims of drug related 
violence can be broken down into three categories based on their role in drug trafficking: 
18 
 
cartel members, government employees, and citizens. The selection of each target has 
specific purposes and characteristics that encourage certain crimes and violent acts over 
others. 
 
Cartel-Cartel Violence 
 
Violence may be committed against members of a drug trafficking organization. Known 
as cartel on cartel violence, this is the kind of violence most associated with drug 
trafficking. The Mexican government estimates that approximately 90% of drug-related 
violence in Mexico target those somehow involved in the drug trade (Beittel, 2012). 
However, this statistic has been met with skepticism as sources outside the Mexican 
government have been unable to validate this claim due to a lack of crucial information. 
This category has two distinct subcategories: inter-cartel violence and intra-cartel 
violence. 
Inter-cartel violence is violence against a separate cartel. As previously 
mentioned, violence is a method of resolving disputes that can arise for a variety of 
reasons; price, purity, delivery times and location, personnel, territory, payment, seizure, 
theft and secrecy (Kan, 2011). Violence is used as the ultimate settler of disputes. DTO's 
target rivals in an attempt to intimidate or remove them in order to increase their own 
share of the drug market.  
Since the purpose is the intimidation and removal of rivals, drug trafficking 
organizations are more prone to certain violent acts over others. Torture, murder and 
assassination are the preferred crimes for accomplishing this goal. Contract killing and 
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murder permanently remove rivals. Torture is useful in that it physically removes rival 
operators temporarily and discourages other rivals from operating. It's important to note 
which crimes are generally not used in this category: arson, kidnapping, extortion and 
assault.  
As the intimidation of rivals is a key component to inter-cartel violence, the 
nature of this violence must be both gruesome and excessive. Recent inter-cartel activity 
supports this. Notes left next to slain victims and large banners at mass graves explain 
why the victim or victims are dead. These so-called narco-messages are tools of 
intimidation against rival cartels, the government and the public by increasing the violent 
reputation of a specific organization (Guerrero-Gutierrez, 2011). The presentation of 
killings is additional evidence of the gruesome and excessive nature of inter-cartel 
violence. In the western state of Durango in 2011, a mass grave was found by the 
Mexican government. The grave held an estimated 200 gunmen from various 
organizations killed by the Sinaloa cartel (Moore, 2012). Cartels have also begun piling 
slain rivals in public places for display. 35 mutilated bodies were found on a downtown 
street in the state of Veracruz with a note stating that "all Zetas would die" (Moore, 
2012). The method and nature of individual killings is no exception to the shocking 
violence in Mexico. The Trans-Border Institute in San Diego estimated that in 2011, 
almost 10% of executed victims (1,173) were tortured before their death, and almost 5% 
were decapitated (Molzahn, Ríos & Shirk, 2012). 
The other subcategory of cartel-cartel violence is intra-cartel violence. This kind 
of violence can be defined as violence within an illegal organization. It serves two 
purposes. First, it is often used as a method of code enforcement (Friman, 2009). In an 
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illegal organization without the backing of the state, some form of cohesiveness must be 
achieved. Violence, and the threat thereof, can be seen as the “glue” that helps hold 
everyone together; the threat of physical punishment holds everyone accountable and 
encourages members to complete their assignments (Guerrero-Gutierrez, 2011). It’s 
important to note that intra-cartel violence in the form of code enforcement is rarely 
documented as often there is little proof it occurred: the physical evidence, such as 
bruises or broken bones, can disappear, and the victim of the crime is unlikely to report 
its occurrence to the government as this would implicate themselves in a transnational 
crime organization. The second purpose of violence within a drug trafficking organization 
is to fill internal vacancy chains (Beittel, 2012). The removal of a drug trafficker, whether 
by government apprehension or cartel violence, results in the opportunity for another 
trafficker to take his place. Should there be more than one potential employee looking for 
a promotion, the two prospects can fight and the victor would claim the open position. 
Filling internal vacancy chains is the more visible form of the two purposes as 
occasionally the loser will be killed. However, it’s important to note that not all 
leadership vacancies are filled through violence. 
As the purposes of intra-cartel violence are to maintain internal cohesion and fill 
internal leadership vacancies (Beittel, 2012), patterns can be seen in its application. This 
violence is more commonly expressed in assaults more than any other crime. Physical 
assaults allow the maintenance of order in an illegal organization by punishing the 
offender without killing the transgressor, who still has the potential to operate and make a 
profit for the organization. Physical assaults also allow the prime candidate for a position 
to be clearly identified without killing the loser. It’s important to note, however, that 
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sometimes the death of the loser is seen as necessary; murder is somewhat common in 
order for the victor to truly secure his position. Logic would state that the death of the 
loser would be more common for higher-ranking positions, but there has been no study of 
this at the time of this paper. Kidnapping is also useful as a method of code enforcement 
and coercion; drug traffickers or retailers are more likely to remain loyal to the cartel if 
their family members are hostages (Associated Press, 2013). Similarly to inter-cartel 
violence, the crimes of arson and extortion are not common methods of code enforcement 
or filling internal gaps of leadership.  
When compared to inter-cartel violence, the nature of intra-cartel violence seems 
relatively tame. There is significantly less loss of life when enforcing rules and filling 
internal gaps in the chain of command. There’s also significantly less cruelty or carnage 
as intra-cartel violence usually lacks the magnitude of intimidation necessary in inter-
cartel violence. 
 
Cartel-Government Violence 
 
A Mexican drug trafficking organization may also commit violence against the 
government. This violence is not limited to only members of the Mexican government; it 
may be directed at those who work for any government, including agents and criminal 
justice educators from the United States. The Mexican government estimates that 
violence against Mexican forces consists of approximately 7% of all DTO-related 
violence (Beittel, 2012). Outside sources confirm that this kind of violence is definitely 
below 10% of all DTO-related violence (Kan, 2011). It's important to note that it can be 
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difficult to ascertain whether a killed government employee had ties to a cartel, as this 
would affect the number of cartel-government deaths. Many of the government forces 
slain by drug trafficking organizations are thought to have, at one point, conspired with 
them (Beittel, 2012). This violence may be directed at security forces, such as the police 
or the military, or those who influence and lead security forces, such as police chiefs, 
politicians and judges.  
Violence against either group has the same three broad purposes. First, and most 
obvious, is the removal of those who attempt to enforce the law. Broadly speaking, 
cartels target anyone who prevents their organization from realizing its profit. This 
includes those that prove themselves effective at tackling organized crime, whether those 
individuals are street officers or senior administrators (Guerrero-Gutierrez, 2011). 
Sometimes the families of those effective individuals are targeted. Hours after 
Melquisedet Córdoba of the Mexican Navy participated in the raid that killed the kingpin 
“El Barbas,” unrecognized gunmen killed his mother, two sisters, brother and aunt in 
their sleep (Kellner & Pipitone, 2010). Secondly, Mexican transnational crime 
organizations may target government workers in order to remove officials that help rivals. 
The officials are often corrupt and in the employ of a rival (Morris 2012) , but that’s not 
always necessary. Middle Tennessee State University professor Stephen Morris 
encompasses both of these purposes in his article Corruption, Drug Trafficking and 
Violence in Mexico: “Anything a public servant does that can be interpreted as helping a 
rival cartel or hurting their own makes them a target.” This mindset easily lends itself to 
targeting rival corrupt officials for violence. Lastly, government employees are targeted 
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in order to persuade the Mexican government to shift its formal or informal enforcement 
strategies (Morris, 2012).  
While all three purposes influence cartel-government violence, the idea that drug 
trafficker violence is used as a method of deterring law enforcement plays a crucial role 
in the type of violence used against government employees. MDTO’s want, above all 
else, impunity to traffic drugs (Beittel, 2012). In the long run, this desire is better served 
by cowing local police and federal agents into inaction rather than removing them. Slain 
officers can be replaced; an intimidated officer consumes government resources that may 
otherwise be used more effectively (Morris, 2012). Also intimidated officers can 
potentially be corrupted, through bribes or threats, to provide intelligence and greater 
revenue for drug traffickers (Morris, 2012; Moore, 2012). The result is that most violence 
committed against this population is designed to intimidate the majority of the 
government rather than remove them (Kan, 2011). To clarify, this is not to say that drug 
trafficking organizations only try to intimidate or never try to kill, but that they know 
their interests are better served through the mass intimidation of government workers.  
This knowledge is reflected in both the type and nature of violent acts committed 
against government security forces. The security forces in Mexico consist of those that 
actively and frequently enforce anti-narcotics laws. That can consist of, but is not limited 
to, preventative, investigative, local and federal police officers, correctional officers, and 
low level officers of the Mexican Army, Navy, and Special Forces. Some TCO's are more 
dangerous for security personnel than others; Los Zetas routinely "green light" the killing 
of military and police during drug trafficking-related violent operations (Hesterman, 
2012). 
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Mexican police and military are at risk of specific violent crimes. Violent acts 
committed towards people in this category include murder, destruction of property, 
kidnapping and assault. While arson has been used, an analysis of arson cases in the first 
semester of 2011 revealed that it's not a common method to fight the police or military 
(Guerrero-Gutierrez, 2011). Barry McCaffrey, the former director of the U.S. Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, testified in 2009 that units of the Mexican police and army 
were also tortured (Kellner & Pipitone, 2010). However, typical violence against security 
forces takes the form of ambushes and overwhelming firepower, as was the case 10 miles 
north of Aguascalientes in December of 2009. Two officers were slain and three were 
wounded when approximately 40 gunmen opened fire with automatic weapons and 
grenades on a police station during a security meeting with the mayor. There was also 
extensive damage to the building (Kellner & Pipitone, 2010).  
In some ways, the nature of violence against security forces is similar to that of 
inter-cartel violence. Both groups are at risk of ambushes, torture, decapitation and 
postmortem mutilation and display (Kellner & Pipitone, 2010). However, it’s important 
to note that cartel victims are more at risk of postmortem mutilation and the public 
display of bodies than the Mexican police or military. 
Violence against government employees is not limited to those on the front line of 
the drug war. Those who lead and administrate front line officers are at risk of violence 
from drug trafficking organizations. Public officials, judges, prison officials, treasury and 
banking officials, governors, mayors, and agency directors have all been targeted 
(Morris, 2012). Police department chiefs are targeted significantly more than others; out 
of the 174 political candidates and senior officials killed by Mexican organized crime 
25 
 
between December 2006 and September 2011, 48% were police chiefs. Mayors were the 
second most targeted occupation at 18% (Guerrero-Gutierrez, 2011). Even a 
gubernatorial candidate, Rodolfo Torre Cantú, was killed in Tamaulipas in 2010 (Morris, 
2012).  
Of special interest to the cartels are those that have received training from the 
United States. In the state of Chihuahua lies La Ciudad Juarez, known as the most violent 
city in the world (Vulliamy, 2010). In 2007 many Mexican officials were trained in the 
United States to improve skills useful in combating the notoriously high murder rate in 
Juarez. By the middle of 2010, 98 Chihuahua officials, including police investigators, 
forensic experts and prosecutors, had been assassinated (Schatz, 2011). 
Mexican criminal justice administrators are more prone to certain kinds of violent 
drug trafficking-affiliated crime than others. Murder in the form of assassinations and 
executions are common, and the threat of kidnapping and assault has grown so severe 
that 75 federal judges requested permission to carry weapons at all times for their 
"personal defense" (Schatz, 2011). Murder, assault and kidnapping are the crimes most 
likely to be committed against criminal justice supervisors.  
It is important to examine the nature of drug trafficking-related violence against 
criminal justice leaders. Violence against government administrators lacks many 
characteristics found in cartel-cartel violence. For instance, there are no mass murders, 
although this likely due to the relatively low numbers of government administrators. 
There are no cases of arson (Guerrero-Gutierrez, 2011), postmortem mutilation or public 
display of bodies. For the most part, the nature of the violence is limited to ambushes, 
assassinations and executions (Schatz, 2011).  
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The targeting of high ranking officials and administrators has had a demoralizing 
effect on both security forces and the public. Some scholars go so far as to say that it has 
affected the state of democracy in Mexico (Beittel, 2012). A study in 2011 found that 
56% of Mexican citizens believe the country is less safe since the government declared 
war on drug traffickers. Additionally, 42% of citizens in that survey think the drug 
traffickers are winning the war (Guerrero-Gutierrez, 2011). Mexican citizens’ mistrust in 
their government has caused many to look for alternate methods of protecting 
themselves, such as protesting, private security and private police agencies (Kellner & 
Pipitone, 2010), and even “vigilante justice via mob lynching’s” (Schatz, 2011). Scholars 
note that the greater the perception of government ineffectiveness, the greater the chance 
that law abiding citizens will either resort to violence against drug distributors or adopt a 
“bunker mentality” (Rengert, 1996). 
 
Cartel-Citizen Violence 
 
Lastly there is violence against citizens associated with neither criminal organizations nor 
the government. These targets are often journalists or businessmen although recently 
random, unaffiliated citizens have been targeted. Citizens are the least common group 
targeted for violence, approximately 2-7%, but this group has the greatest public shock 
and outrage when violence is perpetrated against them (Beittel, 2012). While the term 
‘citizen’ encompasses every remaining occupation, this paper will focus on three groups 
at risk of specific DTO-related crime: journalists, businessmen, and random citizens. 
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Violence is directed at citizens for distinctive and specific purposes. Similarly to 
cartel-government violence, violence targeting citizens is often meant as a form of 
coercion. Some scholars have speculated that the 72 immigrants murdered by Los Zetas 
in August, 2010 were targeted because they refused to traffic narcotics for the criminal 
organizations (Moore, 2012). Drug traffickers may also target citizens for violence in 
order to realize a more direct profit. This is occasionally done by kidnapping immigrants 
and conscripting them as smugglers and gunmen in drug trafficking organizations 
(Guerrero-Gutierrez, 2011). However, violence towards citizens in order to directly 
realize profits is commonly perpetrated through extortion and protection rackets (Snyder 
& Duran-Martinez, 2009).  
Scholars have ascertained that certain civilian populations are more at risk of 
specific violent crimes. Journalists are at particular risk of assault and murder. They are 
targeted in an attempt to intimidate them into self-censoring stories that negatively 
portray drug trafficking organizations or any associated violence (Burnett, 2011). 
Additionally, businessmen are at risk of DTO-related violence in the form of extortion, 
assault and arson. Affluent entrepreneurs are often coerced into illegal protection rackets, 
and are in danger of having their business burned down if they don’t pay (Guerrero-
Gutierrez, 2011). The use of extortion by drug trafficking organizations is rampant: 
according to a 2010 estimate, La Familia Michoacán controlled approximately 85% of 
legitimate businesses in the state of Michoacán (Beittel, 2012). Some business owners are 
at risk of physical assault, murder and kidnapping as well (Kellner & Pipitone, 2010). 
While random citizens are targeted for extortion rackets, they are at a greater risk of 
murder than other crimes (Moore, 2012).   
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Certain civilian populations are more at risk of specific gruesome acts than others. 
As the purpose in targeting journalists is to intimidate other members of the same 
occupation, the nature of MDTO-related violence against them is similar to violence 
against government administrators. Assassinations and executions are common, while 
torture, mass murders, and postmortem mutilations are rare. Violence against journalists 
is exemplified by the attack on September 16th, 2010, when a photojournalist and his 
intern working for the Juarez newspaper El Diario were gunned down in broad daylight 
(Vulliamy, 2010). There’s evidence that the cartels are achieving their goal; Mexican and 
U.S. reporters refuse to track drug-related deaths in Tamaulipas for fear of assassination 
(Schatz, 2011). 
The nature of violence against businessmen appears to be similar to intra-cartel 
code enforcement violence. Loss of life is not the desired immediate goal of either, as it 
would cripple the organizations ability to make money; however, it is sometimes utilized 
in order to further more immediate financial goals. Martinez Reyes, the son of a wealthy 
wine distributer, was kidnapped from a seafood restaurant in Aguascalientes in May of 
2008. He was held for 35 days and tortured before a ransom was paid by his father 
(Kellner & Pipitone, 2010). The case of Gerardo Ibarra also helps characterize extortion 
cases against businessmen. Gerardo ran a successful trucking business between Mexico 
City and Laredo, Texas; his trucks were pre-screened for contraband in order to reduce 
border crossing time. In early 2008 one of his truck drivers was attacked by cartel 
members, who loaded drugs onto the vehicle and demanded he continue across the border 
into the United States. Gerardo told the driver to abandon the vehicle. For the next three 
months Gerardo received threatening messages demanding his compliance with cartel 
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smuggling demands. Gerardo refused, and was gunned down on July 2nd, 10 feet away 
from a police outpost (Kellner & Pipitone, 2010). In both of these cases we see that 
physical harm or killing were not the first, nor the preferred, action taken by the drug 
trafficking organizations.  
The nature of DTO-related violence against random citizens is both more brutal 
and more gruesome than violence against either journalists or businessmen. Random 
citizen violence is directed at those who are at the wrong place at the wrong time; as 
such, it’s the hardest to predict or prevent. However, certain trends are common. When 
random citizens are targeted as a result of false information, the murders generally lack a 
brutal or gruesome element. This was the case in February 2010 when gunmen shot up a 
house in Ciudad Juarez, killing 15 and wounding at least a dozen (Kellner & Pipitone, 
2010). Normally drug trafficking organizations murder random citizens in order to 
generate notoriety. Murders for this reason can have many different gruesome 
characteristics similar to inter-cartel violence. In order to gain notoriety, messages are 
often left at the scene in order to take or blame responsibility of the act (Moore, 2012). 
Such was the case at a mass grave was found near the town of San Fernando, Tamaulipas, 
filled with persons unaffiliated with drug trafficking. One distraught relative of a victim 
stated that "(the drug traffickers) did it because they could" (Moore, 2012). Bodies were 
piled on a downtown street in Veracruz. Some of the bodies were drug traffickers, but 
some were also random citizens who were slain in order to add bulk to the spectacle 
(Moore, 2012). The oil pipeline city of Cadereyta also experienced a body dump, with the 
added horror of postmortem mutilation; most of the bodies were lacking hands, feet, and 
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heads (Moore, 2012). These incidents all illustrate the gruesome and brutal acts that may 
be taken against random citizens. 
 
Conclusions 
 
When Mexican transnational criminal organization violence is placed into victim-based 
categories, one can observe some general patterns about the application of said violence.  
 
Concerning the relationship between the purpose of the violence and its type 
 
When a financial gain can be realized more immediately with the target alive, as is the 
case when DTO's target deviant members, legitimate businessmen, the occasional 
government official or random citizen, the violence is more likely to be harmful, but not 
life threatening: physical assault, torture, kidnapping or extortion. In contrast, if the 
cartels operations are more likely to generate a profit without a person or group of people, 
as is the case with rival cartels or incorruptible or effective government agents, the 
violence is more likely to end in death.  
 
Concerning the relationship between the purpose of the violence and its nature 
 
When attempting to intimidate large groups of a certain occupation, such as rival 
organizations, the public and to a certain extent security forces, drug traffickers opt for 
more gruesome measures: massacres, body dumps, postmortem mutilations, killings with 
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acid and mass murders with hand weapons. However, if their targets are apart of a 
numerically smaller occupation, i.e. journalists, successful criminal justice administrators 
or deviant cartel members, less gruesome methods are used: physical assaults, murders, 
executions or assassinations.  
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